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INTRODUCTION
The impact of affective states on the strategies that recipients use to process persuasive messages has recently received considerable research attention (see Schwarz, Bless and Bohner, 1991 , for a review). The interest in this issue reflects that the cognitive processes involved in persuasion are reasonably well understood (see Eagly and Chaiken, in press; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a , for reviews), rendering the processing of persuasive communications a fruitful, and social psychologically interesting, area for explorations o f the interplay o f affect and cognition in general. In the present paper, we will extend previous laboratory research by investigating the impact of recipients' mood states on their processing of simple persuasive communications in everyday life contexts. In doing so, we will contrast predictions derived from m otivational and capacity explanations o f affective influences on processing strate gies. In addition, we will test rival hypotheses concerning m ood effects on the use of non-content cues, derived from Petty and C acioppo's ( 1986a,b) 'elaboration likelihood model' (ELM ) and from Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly's (1989) 'heuristicsystematic model' (HSM).
Processing persuasive communications
Contem porary models o f persuasion distinguish between two general 'm odes' of attitude change. On the one hand, attitude change can be the result of recipients' careful and effortful evaluation o f the available arguments and other useful infor mation. U nder these circumstances, the m agnitude of change has been shown to be a function of the quality of the available evidence, especially message content, and is mediated by the valence o f recipients' cognitive responses. This has been termed the 'central route' to persuasion Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a,b) or "systematic processing' (Chaiken, 1980 (Chaiken, , 1987 Chaiken el ah, 1989) . On the other hand, attitude change may occur w ithout extensive processing o f message content. Recipients may totally ignore the content o f a message and still form a judgment, merely relying on some superficial context cue, such as the com m unicator's likeability (e.g. Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann, 1983) , or using simplifying 'rules o f thum b' like 'the more arguments, the better' (Chaiken, Axsom, Yates, Wilson, Hicks and Liberman, 1988) . In this mode of attitude change, which has been labelled the 'peri pheral rou te' to persuasion Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a,b) or 'heuristic process ing' (Chaiken, 1980 (Chaiken, , 1987 Chaiken et at., 1989) , attitude change has been shown to be largely independent o f argument quality.
Which of the two 'routes' or processing modes is used depends on recipients' motivation and ability to process the persuasive message. I f both motivation and ability are high, the probability of systematic processing is increased. If either motiva tion or ability are low, heuristic processing may still provide an economic way o f form ing an attitude judgm ent. F o r instance, a person lacking the ability to carefully process message content because of external distraction, may still be able to form an attitude judgm ent on the basis of the com m unicator's credibility (e.g., Kiesler and M athog, 1968) .
The impact of affective states
While current theorizing on the interplay of affect and cognition suggests several different ways in which recipients' mood may influence persuasion within this general Affect and persuasion 513 framework (see Petty, Cacioppo and Kasmer, 1988; Schwarz, Bless and Bohner, 1991 , for an overview), the bulk of empirical evidence indicates th at recipients' affective state influences the extent to which the content of a persuasive message is systematically processed. Specifically, positive affect during message exposure has been shown to decrease systematic processing, as com pared to negative or neutral affect. Accordingly, subjects in an elated mood are typically less persuaded by strong arguments, but more persuaded by weak arguments, than subjects in a neutral or a mildly depressed mood (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz and Strack, 1990; Bless, Mackie and Schwarz. 1990; Innes and Ahrens, 1991; M ackie and W orth, 1989; W orth and M ackie, 1987) .
A lthough this basic finding has been consistently replicated, different process assum ptions have been offered to account for it. focusing either on mood-induced differences in recipients' motivation or on m ood-related restrictions in processing capacity. Mackie and W orth (1989) hypothesized th at positive mood should limit the cognitive capacity available for message processing by priming positive thoughts in memory, which are supposed to be more extensive and interconnected than negative or neutral thoughts (c f (sen, 1987; Matlin and Stang 1979) . Mackie and W orth (1989) predicted and found that offering subjects unlimited time to process a message increased good m ood subjects' systematic processing o f message content to a level that no longer differed from neutral mood subjects' processing. Under processing time restrictions, however, mood differences were obtained. This was interpreted as evidence for the mediating role of cognitive capacity in mood effects on persuasion.
As an alternative account, it has been suggested th a t moods may influence indivi duals' preferred processing style, and that persons in a good mood are more likely to engage in simplified, heuristic processing strategies, whereas persons in a bad m ood may spontaneously engage in more effortful and detail-oriented analytic pro cessing strategies (Schwarz, 1990: Schwarz and Schwarz and Bohner, 1990 ; see also Fiedler, 1988 , Isen, 1987 , and K uhl, 1983 , for related hypotheses). This prediction is derived from the assumption th at 'emotions exist for the sake o f signalling states o f the world that have to be responded to, or that no longer need response and action' (Frijda. 1988, p. 354) .
If so, negative feelings may inform the individual th at its current situation is prob lematic. They may therefore trigger processing styles th at are adequate for analysing the problem atic situation in order to determine adequate reactions. However, any mechanism that increases the accessibility of relevant procedural knowledge may also increase the likelihood that the respective procedures will be applied to other tasks to which they are applicable while the individual is in a negative affective state. M oreover, individuals in a negative state may be motivated to avoid erroneous decisions in a situation that is already characterized as problematic. As a result, a large body o f literature indicates that individuals are more likely to use effortful, detail-oriented, analytical processing strategies spontaneously when they are put in a bad rather than in a good mood (see Schwarz. 1990 , for a review).
Positive affective states, on the other hand, inform the individual that its current environm ent is a safe place. Accordingly, individuals in a good mood may be more likely to take risks and to use simple heuristics in inform ation processing. M oreover, they may have better access to a variety of different procedural knowledge, given that no specific procedure is activated to cope with the current situation. In com bi nation, this may facilitate the higher creativity th a t has been observed under elated G. Bohner, K. Crow, H-P. Erband N. Schwarz mood, but may inhibit the spontaneous use of effortful analytic processing strategies, unless they are required by other active goals. Again, a considerable body of research supports this assumption (see Schwarz, 1990 . for a review).
In line with a motivational rather than a capacity constraints account, research has shown that specific instructional sets may override mood effects on message processing. F o r example. Bless, Bohner ct a!. (1990, Experiment 1) observed that instructing good mood subjects to focus on the inform ational content of the message helped them overcome the processing deficits that were otherwise observed (for related findings see Innes and Ahrens, 1991) . As it seems unlikely th at serious capacity deficits could so easily be eliminated by a change in instructional set, this finding seems to support a motivational interpretation of m ood effects on spontaneous pro cessing style.
Thus, the available evidence concerning the role o f m otivational or capacity changes is mixed. The m atter is additionally complicated by the fact that both Worth and M ackie's and Bless et al.'s m anipulations are open for reinterpretations. Specifi cally, subjects could have interpreted the instruction that they may spend as much time as they wanted to evaluate the message (M ackie and W orth, 1989, p. 29) as indicating that the experimenter expects a careful analysis o f message content, enhanc ing subjects' motivation to process. Conversely. Bless, Bohner et al.'s (1990) instruc tion to focus on message content may have reduced the required processing capacity by providing a clearer specification of the processing objectives.
In the two studies to be reported below, a different approach is used to test the assumption that differential motivation rather than differential capacity leads to the observed differences in message processing. We argue th at capacity restrictions would be highly unlikely to mediate the observed effects if the previously obtained findings could be replicated under conditions that require only minimal cognitive capacity to begin with. Therefore, both experiments make use of very short mundane com munications, in which only one argument (or none at all) is presented. A replica tion of the basic mood influence on the processing of message content under these conditions would suggest that changes in motivation are sufficient to produce the phenom enon.
Affective states and the processing of context cues
While the impact o f recipients' mood on the processing o f message content is welldocum ented, there is only scarce evidence for m ood influences on the processing o f context inform ation (i.e. 'peripheral cues' or 'heuristic cues' in the terminology of the ELM and HSM , respectively; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, b; Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989) . C urrent theoretical approaches to persuasion share the assump tion that reliance on context cues may increase as the systematic elaboration of message content decreases. W ithin the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), a general 'tradeoff between argument elaboration and the operation of peripheral cues' (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, p. 21) has been postulated. This implies that strong effects of context cues should only be obtained if the m otivation or ability to process content inform ation is low. Similarly, the 'heuristic-systematic model o f persuasion' (HSM; Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989) provides for an antagonistic influence o f content and non-content inform ation, which has been discussed as the 'attenuation hypothe sis' (Chaiken et al., 1989, p. 220) .
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The latter model, however, explicitly emphasizes more complex conceptualizations o f the interplay of content and context inform ation in persuasion. Specifically, the HSM holds that systematic and heuristic processing may occur simultaneously under certain conditions. If an individual's motivation to process is high, heuristic cues may be considered as additional evidence when systematic processing alone does not provide sufficient inform ation to assess the validity o f a message. This may be due to either personal (e.g. high personal involvement) or situational factors (e.g. insufficient content inform ation to form a judgm ent; see Chaiken et a/., 1989, p. 226) . In either case, individuals may consider the content of the message and context cues (e.g. the perceived reactions of others to the message) in com bination to assess the validity of the message.
Assuming that negative mood increases the m otivation to use detail-oriented, effortful processing strategies, while positive mood increases the probability o f simpli fying processing strategies, we may derive different predictions about the impact o f affective states on the processing of context cues, depending on a num ber of conditions. Suppose that the content of a communication is sufficient to judge its validity, but that reliance on context cues promises to reduce cognitive effort and th at a relevant heuristic is easily accessible to evaluate the implications o f the context cues (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken et al.t 1989) . Under these conditions, one should expect that persons in a positive mood are more likely than persons in a negative m ood to base their judgm ent on the processing of these cues, at the expense of content elaboration. Individuals in a negative mood, on the other hand, should be more likely to engage in content elaboration, and may pay little attention to context cues, as they can evaluate the message on the basis of its content alone.
If, however, the content o f the message is not sufficient to evaluate its validity, persons in a negative mood may be particularly likely to attend to context cues as an additional source o f inform ation as they strive to evaluate the validity of the communication. Thus, if the content of the message seems insufficient to form a judgem ent, negative m oods may actually increase the processing of non-content cues, as part o f an exhaustive, detail-oriented processing strategy.
Thus, if we combine the assumptions of the inform ative functions approach to affect and inform ation processing with those o f the HSM , the impact of mood on the processing o f context cues should largely depend on two factors: First, the length and complexity of the persuasive message (bearing on the 'sufficiency criterion'), and second, the availability of relevant heuristics.
In two studies, Mackie and W orth (1989, Experiment 2; W orth and Mackie, 1987 ) m anipulated source expertise as a context cue, independently of argument strength and subjects' mood. In these studies, subjects received a short description o f the source, pertaining to its expertise. This description was followed by a message that contained eight (Mackie and W orth, 1989 , Experiment 2) or nine (W orth and Mackie, 1987) arguments. In line with the ELM and the H SM 's 'attenuation hypothesis', subjects in a positive m ood tended to base their attitude judgments more on the expertise cue than did neutral mood subjects. A lthough it is questionable if a relevant judgm ental heuristic (like 'experts can be trusted') was easily available in these exper iments (for a more detailed discussion see Schwarz et a i, 1991) , the results are clearly com patible with the reasoning th at context cues may be used as a means of reducing cognitive effort by individuals in a positive m ood if confronted with a complex message.
In Experim ent 2 of the present paper, we shall, in contrast to the studies just described, examine m ood influences on the processing of context inform ation when a short message is presented, which is likely to provide insufficient inform ation for subjects who are highly motivated to process systematically. As outlined above, it is predicted that under these circumstances, persons in a negative m ood will rely more on context inform ation than do persons in a positive mood. We will return to this issue after presenting Experiment 1, which was designed to replicate the basic finding that positive m ood reduces the processing of message content, using a short and simple message.
EX PERIM EN T 1
A field experim ent was conducted that used a very simple persuasive message contain ing only one strong argum ent or no argument at all, which was presented to subjects in a non-m anipulated or an elated mood. Furtherm ore, subjects' overt behaviour in response to the com m unication was observed instead of some judgm ental measure, to provide a strong indicator of the message's persuasive impact. It was hypothesized that the behaviour o f subjects in a neutral m ood would reflect differences in message content, indicating th at these subjects did in fact process systematically, whereas positive m ood subjects' behaviour would be less affected by message content, replicat ing the previously obtained attitude change findings with overt behaviour as the dependent measure.
Method

Subjects and procedure
Seventy-eight adult users of a public telephone in the pedestrian area of a G erm an city served as subjects. D uring the time allocated for the experiment, any person who found the phone booth empty, and thus did not have to wait in line, was included. The experiment was completed on two sunny summer days.1
Independent variables
In order to induce positive or neutral mood, either a coin (one Germ an m ark) or an onion was placed near the coin slot o f the phone booth, for each subject to find. These objects were placed in random order and in such a fashion th a t it was virtually impossible not to notice them when trying to use the telephone. All subjects who found a coin took possession of it, whereas only one person who found an onion kept it. One third of the subjects was randomly assigned to a 'mood co n tro l' condition, which served exclusively to check the effectiveness o f the m ood m anipula tion (see below). The remaining subjects were random ly assigned to the two levels o f a message strength factor. Before they could place their phone call, subjects were approached by a female confederate who was unaw are o f the subject's m ood con dition. The confederate asked for permission to advance in line and use the telephone first, telling subjects in the 'strong message' condition th a t she had to contact her boss, who would only be in his office for another few minutes. In the 'weak message' condition, the confederate's request was not accompanied by any reason. Thus, the two independent variables constitute a 2 (positive versus neutral mood) x 2 (strong versus weak message) factorial between-subjects design. The proportions of male and female subjects were about equal across conditions.
Dependent variable
Each subjects' behavioural reaction was coded as either complying (1) or not comply ing (0) with the confederate's request. Only immediate positive responses were coded as complying; any questions or arguments provided by the subject resulted in his or her behaviour being coded as not complying. This was done to ensure that no other inform ation exchange except for the initial request itself would provide the cause o f potential positive reactions.
M ood manipulation check
O f the 26 subjects who had been assigned to the 'm ood control' condition, 13 had found a coin and 13 an onion. A fter these subjects had finished their telephone call, they were approached by a male confederate who was unaw are of the subject's m ood condition. The confederate identified himself as an associate o f the local univer sity, conducting a short survey on 'life in x-town'. All subjects agreed to answer three short questions as part o f the survey. The first o f these questions was designed to check the effectiveness o f the mood manipulation: 'How do you feel right now, at this moment? -To answer, please give me a num ber between one and 10. One means "very b ad " and 10 means " very good'" . The confederate read the questions out loud and recorded the subject's response.
Results
M ood
The m anipulation check revealed a marginally significant effect on subjects' reported m ood o f the type of object found. As expected, subjects who had found a coin reported feeling better (M = 7.5) than subjects who had found an onion (A f=6.0), /(24) = 1.52, p < 0.075, one-tailed. Although this effect may seem rather weak, it should be noted that these subjects had completed a telephone call in the time between finding the object and reporting their mood. Thus, m ood differences in the experimen tal conditions, in which subjects were approached by the confederate immediately after they had found the object, are likely to be underestim ated by the procedure adopted here.
Contrast analysis
In line with the hypothesis outlined above as well as with previous results, a specific two-way interaction o f m ood and message strength was predicted. Specifically, the largest proportion of compliance was expected for subjects who were in a neutral mood and were exposed to the strong message, the smallest proportion o f compliance for subjects who were in a neutral mood and were exposed to the weak message. The two good m ood conditions were expected to yield results in between these two extremes.
These considerations are reflected in the theoretically specified set o f contrast weights shown in the lower part of Table 1 . The compliance d ata were analysed using contrast analysis for proportions (R osenthal and Rosnow, 1985, pp. 46-59) .
Behavioural compliance
The proportions o f subjects who complied with the confederate's request are dis played in the upper p art of Table 1 . Inspection of the proportions in each cell reveals that, as predicted, the behaviour of subjects in a neutral mood was strongly influenced by message content: Whereas 92 per cent complied with the strong message, this was true only for 39 per cent o f the subjects who were presented the weak message, resulting in a difference of 53 per cent. F o r subjects in a neutral m ood, the effect o f message strength was much less pronounced, with 75 per cent and 50 per cent compliance for the strong and weak message, respectively, resulting in a difference o f 25 per cent. Numbers in parentheses are condition n's.
The planned contrast analysis yielded a highly significant result, z -3.81,p < 0.005. A dditional com parisons between the strong and weak versions of the message within each m ood condition revealed a highly significant effect o f message strength for subjects in a neutral mood, z = 3.50, p < 0.002, but not for subjects in a good mood, z -1.37, p > 0.15.
Discussion
In summary, the basic finding of previous laboratory studies was replicated, using a behavioural m easure in a natural setting. M ore im portantly, the results support the hypothesis th at recipient's mood influences the processing o f message content even if the message presented is rather simple and does not require m uch processing capacity to begin with. Thus, it seems highly implausible th at the observed m ood effect was m ediated by capacity deficits under positive mood. R ather, the results suggest that subjects in an elated mood may have been less motivated to analyse the presented message in any detail, reflecting that their affective state characterized the situation as non-problem atic (Schwarz, 1990) .
M oreover, a possible alternative explanation based on the potentially distracting nature of finding a coin can be ruled out. If anything, finding a coin in a telephone booth seems less surprising than finding an onion. Accordingly, subjects assigned to the neutral mood condition, who found an onion, should have been more distracted than subjects who found a coin, rendering a distraction-based account unlikely.
The present experiment also dem onstrates that mood influences in persuasion are not restricted to attitude judgments, but are also reflected in overt behaviour. If one considers the seemingly irrelevant nature of the mood-inducing event used in this study, the potential importance of this phenom enon for everyday behaviour should become evident.
In the latter regard, we note that the present study bears some similarity to Langer's (1978 Langer's ( , 1989 Langer, Blank & Chanowtiz, 1978) work on the 'mindlessness' with which people engage in mundane behaviour. The behaviour o f subjects in a positive mood might be characterized as 'mindless' according to Langer's conceptualization, whereas subjects in a neutral mood showed more 'mindfulness' in processing the request. W hereas Langer et al. (1978) emphasized stable features of the person (e.g. chronically accessible scripts) or the situation (e.g. low relevance) as the principal determinants o f mindlessness, the results o f the present experiment suggest that tran sient feeling states may have a similar impact.
EX PER IM EN T 2
Although the behavioural data of Experiment 1 are consistent with the 'informative functions' approach to mood effects on persuasion, no direct evidence concerning the mediating role o f message-related thoughts could be assessed, due to the nature of this field experiment. Accordingly, a conceptual replication and extension o f Exper iment 1 was designed to provide a more stringent test of the mediating role of subjects' cognitive responses. In addition, Experiment 2 tested diverging predictions derived from the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a,b) and the HSM (Chaiken et al., 1989) concerning the processing o f context cues under conditions of low versus high m otiva tion, as outlined above.
Method
Overview and design
Subjects were recruited to participate individually in two ostensibly independent experiments on the topics o f 'vocational aptitude' and 'com m unication'. In the alleg edly 'first study', a positive or negative m ood was induced through bogus feedback about the test result. While the subject was waiting for the 'second study' to begin, an interaction with a confederate was staged. The confederate asked subjects to donate money to a beneficial cause and supported this request with either one strong or one weak argum ent. Simultaneously, the confederate provided a salient context cue that was either strong or weak, namely a list of previous donors, containing few or many names.
These m anipulations resulted in a 2 (good versus bad m ood) x 2 (strong versus weak message) x 2 (strong versus weak context cue) factorial between-subjects design. The central dependent variables were subjects' overt behaviour, their cognitive responses, evaluations o f message content, and recall o f features o f the situation.
Subjects and procedure
Seventy-three students of a West German university (30 female, 43 male) were ran domly assigned to conditions and run in individual sessions. U pon arrival at the laboratory, each subject was paid 5 German M arks for participation. The d ata of nine subjects had to be excluded from the analysis. This was due to extraneous factors (e.g. language problems) for four subjects, while the other five expressed suspicion with respect to the bogus feedback or the authenticity o f the persuasive communication. The drop-out rate was independent of experimental conditions. The data of 64 subjects (25 female, 39 male) remained in the analysis, eight in each experimental condition. The proportion of male and female subjects was approxim a tely equal in all conditions.
M ood induction
Following procedures used by Bohner, Bless, Schwarz and Strack (1988) , a good or bad mood was induced by giving subjects either positive or negative feedback about their results in an alleged 'Vocational A ptitudes Test'. Specifically, each subject had to solve 10 items o f the 'Standard' and 'Advanced Progressive M atrices' tests o f intelligence (Raven, 1958 (Raven, , 1962 2. To enhance the im portance of the task, subjects were informed that the test was an excellent predictor o f success in academic pro fessions. The average perform ance in student populations was said to be six correct solutions. The task w'as explained in w'ritten instructions, and an example plus solu tion was provided. The experimenter made sure th at the subject had understood the task. Then he presented each item on a card and checked the solution time with a stopwatch. The time limit for each item was 45 seconds. After this time, the subject had to m ark his or her solution on a 'solution sheet'. To w arrant the credibility of the feedback, subjects were encouraged to check a solution for each item, even if they were uncertain about it.
After completion o f the task, the experimenter took the subject's solution sheet to a distant table, ostensibly to check the test result. In the positive mood conditions, he told the subject: 'Very good! These are eight correct solutions. This corresponds to the 86th percentile, which means that only 14 per cent o f the students solve eight or more items correctly'. In the negative m ood conditions, he informed the subject th at he or she had solved only four items correctly, corresponding to the 14th percentile. 
M ood manipulation check
Following the feedback, subjects answered a questionnaire related to the 'subjective experience o f the test situation'. The first question was designed to check the efficiency of the m ood m anipulation and read: 'How do you feel now at this moment?' ( 1 = 'b ad '; 9 = 'good'). The remaining questions were fillers or pertained to sociodemographic variables. Following completion of the questionnaire, the experimenter announced that the first experiment was over and asked the subject to follow him to another laboratory, where the second experiment would be run. Outside of the second labora tory, he apologized and asked the subject to wait on a chair in the corridor because it would take a few more minutes to get things ready. Then he went into the laboratory, leaving the subject alone.
Persuasive communication
A bout 30 seconds later, the subject was approached by a female confederate, who was unaware o f the subject's mood condition. The confederate wore a name tag that identified her as a member o f a (fictitious) local organization supporting disabled students. She also carried a clipboard and a collecting-box. She greeted the subject and asked if she might talk to him or her for a moment. She then explained that her organization was conducting a collection on the campus.
Depending on experimental conditions, she said that the collected money would be used for the construction of ramps for wheelchairs at university buildings (strong argument) or for building a separate library for the disabled {weak argument), respec tively. Pretesting had revealed a reliable difference in perceived argum ent strength for these two projects.
While presenting her argument, the confederate showed the subject a sheet with the headline 'List of C ontributors' that contained either two {weak consensus cue) or 19 names {strong consensus cue). Pretesting o f the two versions o f the list in com bination with a variety of collection purposes had indicated the effectiveness of this cue m anipulation.
If a subject asked any questions, these were answered according to a pre-planned schema, which followed the general maxim not to give any additional detail infor mation. A fter the subject had donated or had refused to do so, the confederate thanked, said good-bye, and left. A bout 1 minute later, the experimenter opened the door of the laboratory, apologized once again for the delay, and asked the subject in .
At this point, the subject was informed that the interaction with the money collector had been part o f 'the second study', and additional dependent variables were assessed.
Dependent variables
Behaviour As the key behavioural measure of persuasive impact, it was recorded i f a subject donated money (1) or did not (0). In addition, the amount donated was registered. It should be noted that all subjects had some money at their disposal, as they had been paid 5 German M arks (DM) for participation in advance. M oreover, this money had been handed out in small coins (one coin of DM 2, two coins o f DM 1, one coin o f D M 0.50, and five coins o f DM 0.10).
Cognitive responses Immediately after being informed that the interaction with the confederate was p art of the study, each subject was given 3 minutes to list all thoughts that had come to mind during this interaction, on a sheet containing several boxes. Following the standard procedure proposed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986a, p. 38) , subjects were encouraged to report any thought, even if it seemed irrelevant to them. Following the thought listing, subjects were asked to categorize these cogni tive responses as being favourable, unfavourable, or neutral with respect to the donation request.
Recall Next, each subject was asked to recall as exactly and completely as possible all that the confederate said, the objects that she carried, the name o f her organization, and the purpose of the collection.
Evaluation o f purpose Finally, each subject had to rate the usefulness of the collec tio n 's purpose on a scale ranging from 1, 'not at all useful', to 9, 'very useful*.
Before leaving, subjects were probed for suspicion in an extensive post-experimen tal interview. Then they were thoroughly debriefed, were given back any money they had donated, and were dismissed.
Results
M ood
As expected, subjects who had been given negative feedback reported feeling signifi cantly worse (Af = 4.77) than subjects who had been given positive feedback (A f=6.53), F ( l,55) = 18.76, /><0.00053. In a 2 x 2 x 2-analysis of variance (ANOVA), no other significant effects emerged, all p>0A5. Thus, we conclude that the mood m anipulation was successful.
Behaviour
The percentage of donors and the mean am ount donated in each condition are given in Table 2 . The amount donated is given in German Marks.
A 2 x 2 x 2-ANOVA revealed that a higher proportion of subjects in a positive m ood (A f-0 .9 1 ) than o f subjects in a negative m ood (M = 0.72) contributed to an interaction of argument strength and the consensus cue m anipulation, r(56) = 2.31, p < 0.03. N o other simple effects were detected, allp > 0.25.
Recall
Recall protocols were coded by two independent judges for accuracy o f three content categories: the purpose of the collection, the list of contributors, and the name of the collecting organization. All inconsistencies were resolved by discussion. For 'pur pose' and 'organization', recall could be coded 0 ('no or incorrect recall'), 1 ('partially correct'), or 2 ('correct'). The agreement between judges was good, r -0.83 and 0.92, respectively. F or 'list', possible scores were 0 ('no recall') or I ('recall'); agree ment between judges was perfect, r = 1.00.
A 2 X 2 X 2-ANOVA indicated that subjects in a negative mood tended to recall the purpose of the collection better (M = 1.56) than did subjects in a positive mood (M = 1.16), ^(1,56) = 3,93, p < 0.06, all other p > 0.29. Similar, but nonsignificant patterns emerged for the other two recall measures (see Table 4 ). The possible range for the variables in the left and middle columns is 0 to 2, for the variable in the right column 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better recall.
Evaluation o f purpose
N ot surprisingly, building wheelchair ramps was rated as being more useful (M = 7 .8 1 ) than building a separate library (M = 6 .1 9 ), ^(1,55) = 9.87, p < 0.0054. M ore im portantly, a marginally significant two-way interaction o f m ood and argu ment strength emerged, F (l,55) = 3.40, p < 0.07, indicating that subjects in a negative mood strongly differentiated between the strong (M = 8 .4 4 ) and weak purpose (,W = 5.88), t{ 17.0) = 3.90, /? < 0.002, whereas subjects in a positive mood did not (ATs = 7.19 and 6.53, respectively), /(21.1) = 0.80,/? > 0.40.5
4 One subject did not respond to the question concerning the evaluation of the collection's purpose. 5 Separate variance estimates were used in these simple effects /-tests because of in homogeneity of variances. Two additional marginally significant two-way interactions were obtained for the evaluation of purpose: In the 'weak cue'-condition, subjects tended to differentiate more between the strong and weak purpose 
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Correlational analyses C orrelational analyses were conducted to explore the relationship o f subjects' cogni tive responses and overt behaviour. As shown in Table 5 , behavioural measures of persuasion were significantly correlated with the favourability o f cognitive responses and with the evaluation o f the collection's purpose under bad m ood con ditions, but not under good m ood conditions. M oreover, tests of differences in the correlations obtained under the two mood conditions indicated th at the correlations of both behavioural measures and the evaluation of the collection's purpose were significantly higher under bad than under good mood conditions (c f Table 5 ). 
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 provide a replication and extension o f the findings o f Experim ent I. Once more, pronounced mood effects on subjects' overt behaviour were observed, following a short and uncomplicated com munication. Furtherm ore, the results clearly support the notion that individuals who are in a negative mood may carefully evaluate both content and context inform ation when processing a persuasive communication, whereas individuals in a positive m ood were likely to remain unaffected by either message content or context cues. T hrough the analysis o f subjects' cognitive responses, evaluations, and memory for details, Experiment 2 also provided inform ation about the processes that mediated the im pact o f affective state on the behavioural responses. These data suggest that the behaviour of individuals in a negative mood clearly depended on the favourability o f the thoughts that came to mind during the persuasive com munication, as well as on the perceived usefulness o f the cause. In contrast, the behaviour o f subjects in a positive m ood showed only moderate or no association with cognitive responses or evaluations, respectively. Finally, negative m ood subjects' slightly superior recall of relevant details is compatible with the assumption that they paid closer attention to the particular aspects o f the situation.
The finding o f a simultaneous impact of message content and context cues under negative mood, in com bination with the absence o f such an im pact under positive mood, supports the assumption o f the HSM that highly m otivated individuals may 'access and scrutinize all inform ational input for its relevance and im portance to their judgm ent task, and integrate all useful information in forming their judgem ents' (Chaiken et al., 1989, p. 212, italics added) .
The results cannot be accounted for adequately, however, by the E L M 's postulate of a 'tradeoff between argum ent elaboration and the operation o f peripheral cues' (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a, p. 21) . A lthough the authors of the ELM point out that there may be instances when both arguments and peripheral cues are operative (e.g. Petty and Cacioppo, 1984) , the model clearly predicts that any factor that increases elaboration likelihood, including bad mood, should enhance argument impact and decrease cue impact, while the reverse should be true for any factor decreasing elaboration likelihood, including good mood. Thus, the ELM cannot account for the simultaneous decrease o f both argument and cue processing under good mood, as com pared to bad mood, that was observed in Experiment 2.
It should be noted, however, that the ELM was originally conceptualized to explain attitude change when a message containing numerous arguments is presented. As documented by a large body o f research (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman, 1981; Petty et al., 1983) , under these circumstances, a 'trad eo ff between content and cues is more likely to be observed than under the conditions realized in the present study. We shall return to this issue in the general discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results o f the reported studies provide clear support for the notion th at the influence o f mood on the processing of persuasive communications is mediated by differences in processing style, as predicted by the informative functions approach (Schwarz, 1990) . It seems highly unlikely that the observed effects are due to capacity differences, as the situations in these two studies required only minimal capacity to begin with. This does not imply, however, that capacity constraints under positive m ood are generally implausible -they may be observed in different types of situa tions, depending on the type of event th at elicited affect, and on affect intensity (c f Taylor, in press). The present experiments suggest, however, that m otivational influences o f mood are sufficient to produce differences in inform ation processing, even if rather mild m ood inductions are used, as was the case in Experiment 1.
Behavioural decisions and the impact of good mood: the mediating role of scripts
An apparent inconsistency between the findings of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 deserves further attention. Whereas the predicted interaction of affective state and argument quality was obtained in both experiments, good mood subjects in Exper iment 2 were generally more likely to donate money, consistent with a large body o f research on affect and helping behaviour (see Schaller and Cialdini (1990) for a review). In contrast, being in a good mood did not per se influence subjects' willing ness to let a confederate advance in line in Experiment 1. We propose th at this reflects the impact o f affective states on 'mindless' behaviour.
According to Langer et al. (1978) , 'mindless' behaviour is due to subjects' reliance on overleamed scripts th at are applicable to the situation at hand (Schank and Abelson, 1977) . In general, this reliance should be more pronounced under the heuris tic processing conditions elicited by elated moods. However, the specific behavioural decision depends on the implications o f the m ost accessible script. In Experiment 2, a 'money collection script' may have been available to subjects, including that the collector explains the purpose of the collection (which is legitimate by default), and the target person donates a small amount. Complying to this script did not interfere with any of the subjects' ongoing activities in Experiment 2, as they were waiting for the next experiment to begin. In Experiment I, on the other hand, a 'telephone call script' was likely to be activated before the confederate stated her request. Complying with the request would therefore have interfered with the ongoing sequence of scripted behaviour. As a result, reliance on the most accessible script would have opposite consequences for subjects' reactions in the two studies: Whereas pursuing the activated script would lead to noncom pliance in Experiment 1, the reverse would be true for Experiment 2.
These conjectures are compatible with the notion that affective states serve inform a tive functions (Schwarz, 1990) . From this point o f view, it would be highly dysfunctio nal to rely on overleamed scripts for persons whose negative affective state informs them that their current situation may be problematic. Conversely, if a positive affec tive state indicates that the current situation is safe, script-guided behaviour would promise high efficiency. Future studies should explicitly m anipulate the accessibility o f different scripts to test the prediction that behavioural decisions are more scriptguided under good than under bad moods.
Anticipation of judgment as a determinant of context impact
In contrast to the present studies, all previous experiments on mood and persuasion have presented written (Bless el al. 1990; Innes and A hrens, 1991; Mackie and W orth, 1989; W orth and Mackie, 1987) or taped messages (Bless, Bohner et al., 1990) in laboratory settings. Accordingly, the recipients were usually aware from the outset that some kind of judgm ent or evaluative response (though n o t necessarily about the message's topic) may be expected from them, m otivating subjects to pay some attention to relevant inform ation. This may have contributed to the finding that individuals in a positive mood made some use o f non-content inform ation in order to form a judgm ent under conditions that confronted them with a rather com plex message (Mackie and W orth, 1989; W orth and Mackie, 1987) . In contrast, good m ood subjects in the present Experiment 2, who did not anticipate th at a decision or judgm ent would be required, were neither influenced by variations in message content nor by variations in context cues. This suggests that individuals in an elated mood only pay attention to context cues when currently active processing goals require them to do so. much as Bless et al. (1990, Experiment 1) observed for message content.
Mood and the use of message content and context cues: Some conjectures
The above considerations suggest th at future research on affect and persuasion might benefit from a more explicit treatm ent of message complexity, script or schema accessi bility, and expected processing objectives. We assume th at persons in a positive m ood, whose affective state informs them that their current environm ent is safe (Schwarz. 1990) , are generally less motivated to pay close attention to content or to non-content inform ation and to elaborate on its implications in any detail. As
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a result, they may be neither influenced by message content nor by context cues, as was the case in Experiment 2. Rather, their judgm ents or behaviours may be a function of pre-existing schemata or scripts. If they do anticipate that they may have to form a judgm ent, on the other hand, they may simplify this task by relying on non-content cues, provided that a relevant schema is easily accessible. This assumption is com patible with Petty and Cacioppo's (1986a.b) 'peripheral route to persuasion', and equivalent to the heuristic processing mode described by Chaiken (1980 Chaiken ( , 1987 Chaiken et at., 1989) . It is also in line with empirical findings (Mackie and W orth, 1989; W orth and Mackie, 1987) .
Finally, systematic processing of message content is only expected under elated moods when recipients are explicitly instructed to pay attention to the quality of the arguments (Bless et at., 1990, Experiment 1) or when the issue is of extreme importance.
Recipients in a negative mood, on the other hand, whose affective state informs them that the situation may be problematic (Schwarz, 1990) , are assumed to pay close attention to incoming information and to elaborate on its implications, choosing what Petty and Cacioppo (1986a.b) termed the 'central route to persuasion'. As a result, their judgements and behavioural decisions reflect an impact of message content, independently of the expected processing objectives. If message content is insufficient to form a judgm ent, however, these subjects may turn to the implications o f context cues in addition to message content, as suggested by the 'sufficiency criter ion' of the HSM (Chaiken et aL, 1989) . Under these circumstances, attitude judgm ents or behavioural decisions are a function of message content and context inform ation, as was observed in the bad mood conditions o f Experiment 2.
In summary, the present conjectures and findings indicate that how we feel may strongly influence how we react to attempts to persuade us. Extending previous laboratory research, the reported studies dem onstrated that a complex interplay o f recipients' mood, message quality, and contextual cues determines persuasive suc cess in everyday settings, reflecting that individuals in an elated mood are less likely to engage in detail-oriented systematic information processing than individuals in neutral or mildly depressed moods.
